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52 
Justice Scalia: Affirmative or Negative? 
Stephen M. Griffin
†
 
My focus in this essay is on Justice Scalia’s distinctive 
contributions to constitutional theory,
1
 especially the theory of 
constitutional interpretation. It could be said that in terms of 
words on the page, Justice Scalia wrote relatively little on 
constitutional theory, especially in comparison to Judge Robert 
Bork,
2
 someone who Justice Scalia was often compared with in 
the 1980s. Yet there is no doubt that Scalia’s writings were 
enormously influential, especially with respect to his advocacy 
of the version of originalism known as original public meaning.
3
 
In understanding Scalia’s approach to constitutional 
theory, I suggest we should take inspiration from a key 
formative experience he had in college as detailed in Bruce 
Allen Murphy’s lengthy, well-researched biography.
4
 Murphy’s 
 
†  W.R. Irby Chair and Rutledge C. Clement, Jr. Professor in 
Constitutional Law, Tulane Law School. Copyright © 2016 by Stephen M. 
Griffin. Email: sgriffin@tulane.edu.
 
 1. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); Antonin Scalia, Address Before the 
Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties (June 14, 1986) in 
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL MEANING 
JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK, 101 (1987) [hereinafter Scalia, Address]; 
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann 
ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts]; Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, 
Originalism]; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1175 (1989). 
 2. There is no real counterpart in Scalia’s writings to Bork’s lengthy 
treatment of themes in constitutional theory. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); 
ROBERT H. BORK, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
IND. L.J. 1 (1971). 
 3. Scalia’s influence is attested to by two recent biographies that I will be 
drawing on in this essay. JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND 
CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA (2009); BRUCE 
ALLEN MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE (2014). 
 4. See MURPHY, supra note 3. 
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book, which is indeed somewhat one-sided to Scalia’s 
detriment, was not well received by certain legal academics,
5
 
but it struck me that this critical reaction ignored some 
valuable insights Murphy carefully developed over the course of 
reviewing nearly the entirety of Scalia’s life. 
Consider Scalia’s pugnacious argumentative style, one of 
his widely acknowledged traits. As Murphy recounts, in 2011 
Linda Greenhouse raised the “puzzle” of Scalia repeatedly 
savaging his fellow Justices in his opinions to little effect, 
saying she couldn’t “think of an example of one of Justice 
Scalia’s bomb-throwing opinions ever enticing a wavering 
colleague to come over to his corner.”
6
 She wondered, “what 
does this smart, rhetorically gifted man think his bullying 
accomplishes?”
7
 For his part, while of course Scalia did not see 
himself as a bully, he readily admitted that he loved to engage 
in disputation simply for the sake of argument.
8
 
Greenhouse might be less puzzled after reading the part of 
Murphy’s biography that describes Scalia’s exceptional success 
as an intercollegiate debater.
9
 As a member of the top team 
fielded by Georgetown’s justly famous Philodemic Society in the 
early 1950s, Scalia participated in competitive policy debate, 
sometimes known as “NDT” debate after the National Debate 
Tournament that ends the year. I have some familiarity with 
this sort of debate, having participated in it (albeit two decades 
after Scalia) for four years at the University of Kansas.
10
 
The sort of debate in which Scalia and I participated is 
basically an intellectual team competition centered around a 
policy resolution whose merits are debated all year long. Each 
 
 5. See, e.g., Justin Driver, How Scalia’s Beliefs Completely Changed the 
Supreme Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Sept. 9, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/ 
article/119360/scalia-court-one-reviewed-justin-driver; Steven G. Calabresi & 
Justin Braga, The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Response to 
Professor Bruce Allen Murphy and Professor Justin Driver (Feb. 24, 2015) 
(unpublished book review), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2569336. 
 6. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 433 (quoting Linda Greenhouse, Justice 
Scalia Objects, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes 
.com/2011/03/09/justice-scalia-objects/). 
 7. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 433. 
 8. Id. at 374. 
 9. Id. at 22–27. 
 10. I am pleased to identify some influential legal academics who were 
also exceptional NDT debaters, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. They 
include Laurence Tribe, Stewart Jay, Erwin Chemerinsky, Lawrence Solum, 
and Frank B. Cross. I am sure there are other examples! 
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team must be prepared to advocate both on the “Affirmative” 
side of the resolution by proposing a specific plan of action and 
the “Negative” side, criticizing in detail whatever plan the 
other team defends. All debates at tournaments, whether they 
are preliminary or elimination rounds, are scored by judges. 
Success in competitive debate depends on skillful advocacy 
and in-depth research, which often leads to an appreciation of 
arcane policy details. The resolutions I debated were quite 
general, allowing for a multitude of possible Affirmative plans. 
We became familiar with nuclear war targeting strategy and 
the possibility of global climate change years before such ideas 
became common currency. The overarching purpose of debate is 
education in the art of rhetoric or persuasive argument. This is 
a purpose that Scalia, who already possessed an excellent 
classical education before college, no doubt understood quite 
well. 
The kind of talent Scalia displayed and his extraordinary 
success in competitive debate has its downside. Debaters can 
fall into the trap of supposing that the “take no prisoners” 
techniques that spell success in debate tournaments will 
transfer readily to other contexts. Scalia’s obvious enthusiasm 
for argument for its own sake plausibly led him to make this 
assumption.
11
 I think we can profitably use this hypothesis to 
analyze some of Scalia’s well-known theoretical moves. 
One valuable point Murphy hits on is that the key to 
winning debate rounds is not simply to use good arguments to 
win once or twice, but to systematically develop and advance 
the “unanswerable argument.”
12
 How does one do this? One 
available pathway is to deploy preemptive arguments. In 
debate, a preemptive argument is one structured to answer (or 
avoid) the most likely objections before they are made. Once the 
opposing team duly makes the obvious objection, they can be 
made to look foolish in rebuttal.
13
 
Justice Scalia consistently resorted to preemptive 
arguments in making his most well-known contributions to 
constitutional theory. That is, he sought to occupy the 
argumentative terrain in such a way so that counter-
 
 11. See BISKUPIC, supra note 3, at 303–05. 
 12. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 23. 
 13. I should make it clear that I am not objecting to preemptive 
arguments as such. Rather, I am arguing that Justice Scalia used preemptive 
arguments in ways that worked to hinder the progress of constitutional 
theory. 
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arguments could not get off the ground. Before I discuss some 
examples, we should observe that one alternative to making 
preemptive arguments is to genuinely engage with opposing 
points of view. Scalia never showed much interest in following 
John Stuart Mill’s admonition that in addressing the 
controversies of the day, one should always attempt to refute 
the strongest possible version of the opposing position.
14
 By the 
way, Mill’s advice is most assuredly not followed in 
intercollegiate debate. In assessing Scalia, we should keep in 
mind that debate is a competitive activity and debaters are not 
in the habit of helping their opponents. 
Scalia’s advocacy of originalism as original public meaning, 
which was novel at the time, is an excellent example of the use 
of preemptive argument. As Murphy describes, when Scalia 
presented the idea of original public meaning in a 1986 speech, 
he did not specify how this interpretive method worked.
15
 He 
rather used the logical possibility of original public meaning to 
occupy the argumentative terrain in a way that highlighted the 
deficiencies of original intent as an alternative. Originalism 
understood as original intent was under heavy attack in the 
1980s by respected legal academics.
16
 Scalia used the idea of 
original meaning to shift the argumentative ground given the 
widely acknowledged difficulties of determining the collective 
intent of the framers of the Constitution. 
From a college debate perspective, we might say that 
Scalia was using a preemptive argument in the negative. 
Scalia’s 1986 speech was more about pointing out the flaws in 
the opposing perspective than in advancing an affirmative case. 
The somewhat-overdrawn contrast Scalia presented was 
between approaches to interpretation that relied on publicly 
verifiable evidence of constitutional meaning versus approaches 
that invoked, as Scalia put it, “what the Framers might 
secretly have intended.”
17
 
The contrast was questionable for reasons constitutional 
scholars already appreciated at the time Scalia presented his 
ideas. Arguing in 1988 for the original intent approach, for 
example, respected constitutional scholar Richard Kay provided 
 
 14. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 98–99 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 
1974). 
 15. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 125–26. 
 16. See, e.g., INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER 
ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990). 
 17. Scalia, Address, supra note 1, at 103. 
  
56 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW HEADNOTES  [101:52 
 
some reasons why there was little real difference between 
original meaning and original intent: 
As a practical matter, an approach which relies on ordinary meanings 
will usually result in the same interpretation that would follow from 
original intentions adjudication. We expect the constitution-makers to 
use words according to ordinary usage at the time of enactment. The 
best evidence of the enactors’ intent is the language they used. 
Indeed, in many cases, any other conclusion is so unlikely that an 
explicit reference to extrinsic evidence of intent is unnecessary. 
Certainly, when most readers agree that a particular clause or phrase 
means one thing, the burden of persuasion ought to be on the 
advocate of some other meaning. Such a presumption is fully 
consistent with original intentions adjudication and a convenient rule 
of administration.
18
 
So Scalia was exaggerating a bit by stressing the “secret” 
nature of the framers’ deliberations at Philadelphia. To be sure, 
as Scalia noted, the content of Madison’s notes of the 
Philadelphia Convention was not known until 1840.
19
 Yet it is 
also unlikely that the framers used one set of meanings for the 
words in the Constitution at Philadelphia and then substituted 
another during the ratification debates. The framers could rely 
on their Philadelphia deliberations being secret, but they also 
knew they would have to defend their handiwork openly. After 
all, their signatures were on the document. This meant that it 
was likely any problems with discovering the original intent of 
the framers did not flow from the secret character of the 
Philadelphia deliberations and thus would transfer over to the 
quest for original public meaning. Yet Scalia, using preemptive 
argument to shift the focus of the debate, made it appear 
through the artful use of rhetoric that the two approaches were 
sharply different. 
To my knowledge, no one has ever followed up in a 
systematic way to determine whether there were positions 
taken on constitutional meaning at Philadelphia that were 
different from the positions defended by framers during the 
ratification debates. We should also keep in mind that when 
Scalia began his career, everyone—liberals and conservatives 
alike—resorted to the use of eighteenth-century historical 
 
 18. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional 
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 234–35 
(1988) (citations omitted). 
 19. Scalia, Address, supra note 1, at 104. 
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evidence in constitutional argument.
20
 In the 1970s and after, 
for example, liberals used such evidence to show that Congress 
had the exclusive power to decide for war and to defend the 
active use of judicial review to protect individual rights. As I 
will discuss below, this bears on Scalia’s characteristic 
contention that the choice is between originalism and 
nonoriginalism, not different takes on what the historical 
evidence shows. 
Indeed, when push came to shove, no one was interested in 
abandoning the evidence we inherited from Philadelphia.
21
 
Evidence from the deliberations at the Federal Convention is 
probative of constitutional meaning on multiple grounds. We 
respect and use this evidence because the framers themselves 
considered it to be relevant, because of what Michael Dorf has 
termed their “heroic” authority, and given that they argued 
over and indeed changed the wording of the Constitution 
during their deliberations, their handiwork shows its design 
and purpose.
22
 Also worth mentioning here is the considerable 
insight, advanced by the eminent historian Jack Rakove, that 
at the insistence of the Federalists, state ratifiers could not 
condition ratification on making alterations to the Constitution. 
This meant that in the end, the vote taken at the ratification 
conventions was up or down on the whole document as opposed 
to working through it clause by clause in the light of proposed 
alternative phrasings.
23
 This made the ratification conventions 
less useful as an authoritative source of constitutional 
meaning. 
The distinction Scalia promoted between original public 
meaning and original intent was thus more apparent than real. 
Nevertheless, his acolytes were inspired by the notion of a “new 
originalism” and rebooted it on this basis.
24
 I believe this had 
 
 20. For a systematic study of the use of originalism by the Supreme 
Court, including the Warren Court era, see FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED 
PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013). 
 21. See, e.g., Scalia, Originalism, supra note 1, at 858. As Scalia noted in 
this lecture, evidence from the founding period must be used carefully. Id. at 
856. For a highly significant reminder of this truth, see MARY SARAH BILDER, 
MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (2015). 
 22. Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional 
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1800–16 (1997). 
 23. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 107–30 (1996). 
 24. See Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1185. 
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an unfortunate impact on constitutional theory, a point I will 
turn to shortly. For now, I would like to provide another 
important instance of Scalia’s use of preemptive argument. 
In one of his best known lectures, “Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil,” Scalia went on the offensive, making an affirmative case 
for the original public meaning approach and arguing that it 
was superior to the competing approach to constitutional 
interpretation.
25
 Here Scalia’s preemptive move was to 
nominate “nonoriginalism” as the alternative to original public 
meaning. As Scalia saw it, nonoriginalism was the rejection of 
original meaning in favor of using contemporary social meaning 
to interpret the Constitution.
26
 For Scalia, nonoriginalism was 
barely comprehensible.
27
 It was clearly illegitimate because, by 
definition, it threw out the law of the Constitution in favor of 
the evolving mores of contemporary society.
28
 
Scalia’s nonoriginalism was always a straw man, not the 
least because it was based on a series of misleading 
comparisons. In his lecture Scalia discussed how to resolve the 
issue of the President’s power to remove executive officers by 
using the method of original meaning.
29
 He contrasted original 
meaning to some exceedingly general statements made by the 
constitutional scholars he called nonoriginalist to the effect 
that the Constitution invites us to make it relevant for today by 
using contemporary social values.
30
 By and large, these scholars 
were concerned with the exceedingly difficult interpretive 
problems posed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, not 
the more specific question of the removal power. Another 
problem was that Scalia compared the use of originalism in a 
leading Supreme Court opinion on the removal issue, Myers v. 
United States,
31
 with the pronouncements of scholars 
addressing some of the most abstract issues in constitutional 
law and theory. A fairer test would have been to contrast the 
reasoning of Myers with an equally influential nonoriginalist 
opinion, say, Brown v. Board of Education.
32
 
 
 25. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 1. 
 26. See id. at 852–56; Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 1, at 38. 
 27. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 89. 
 28. Scalia, Originalism, supra note 1, at 854–55. 
 29. Id. at 856–61. 
 30. Id. at 853–54. 
 31. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Having provided two examples of Scalia’s use of 
preemptive argument, I will now move to a discussion of why I 
believe this rhetorical strategy had a deleterious influence on 
the progress of constitutional theory. As I have suggested, 
Scalia’s first move from original intent to original meaning had 
the desired effect of rebooting the debate—but without much 
attention to whether the inquiry into original meaning was 
substantially different from original intent. The reason both 
methods were similar is that they both relied on historical 
evidence as a source of legal authority. This meant they were 
both equally vulnerable to critiques by historians launched at 
almost exactly the same moment Scalia introduced the idea of 
original meaning. Scalia’s biographer Murphy draws 
appropriate attention to the historians’ critique throughout his 
account of Scalia’s rise to prominence as a leader of the 
conservative legal movement.
33
 
Scalia’s shift to original meaning had a noticeable and 
unfortunate influence on debates over executive power in the 
1990s and after.
34
 Under the theory of original public meaning, 
the task of interpreting Article II involves determining the 
“original” and “public” meaning of terms like “executive power.” 
How did legal scholars carry out this project? In general, they 
looked for evidence concerning the semantic meaning 
“executive power” had for the public that read the Constitution, 
perhaps using a reasonable eighteenth-century person 
standard. I put these terms in scare quotes because the public 
that existed in 1787–88 as the Constitution was debated and 
ratified was not necessarily the same public that existed in the 
American colonies of the seventeenth or mid-eighteenth 
century. Nonetheless, executive power scholars inspired by 
Scalia began with those earlier periods. This is partly because 
they saw Locke’s writings on government and Blackstone’s 
circa-1760s treatise as providing reliable evidence of the 
original public meaning of executive power. These scholars 
then tended to use a presumption that this meaning carried 
forward into the critical period of the 1780s, unless there was 
specific evidence to the contrary. In his controversial work on 
war powers, for example, John Yoo tended to fix the meaning of 
 
 33. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 3, at 167–68, 248–49, 391, 394–98, 410–
14. 
 34. Cf. Stephen M. Griffin, The Executive Power, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 343, 350 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A. 
Graber, & Sanford Levinson eds., 2015). 
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executive power (including the phrase “declare war”) by using 
evidence from mid-eighteenth century England.
35
 He then 
constructed his entire argument around the assumption that 
this meaning changed not at all through the Revolutionary 
War, the adoption of the Articles of Confederation, the critical 
period of the 1780s, and the writing and ratification of the 
Constitution.
36
 This modus operandi suggests that the method 
of original public meaning depends on the existence of a stable 
baseline of constitutional meanings prior to the Philadelphia 
Convention. But why should this pose a problem? 
Because the leading historical scholarship on the formation 
of the Constitution, including the work of Bernard Bailyn, 
Gordon Wood, Jack Rakove and many other historians, showed 
that the critical period destabilized the baseline for 
understanding the words and phrases in the Constitution, 
including such critically important doctrines such as federalism 
and separation of powers. Influenced strongly by Scalia’s 
advocacy of the original public meaning approach, executive 
power scholars developed their own custom-built 
historiography without proper consideration of the prior 
seminal work of these historians.
37
 Rakove’s criticism of Scalia’s 
key original meaning opinion in the Second Amendment case of 
District of Columbia v. Heller
38
 serves well as a summary of the 
historians’ critique: 
Scalia’s version of originalism/textualism, as applied in this opinion, 
seems oblivious to the most important findings that historians from 
Edmund Morgan (writing on the Stamp Act) on through [Bernard] 
Bailyn, [Gordon S.] Wood, myself and others have argued over the 
last half-century: that this was a deeply creative era in 
constitutionalism and political thought, and the idea that static 
definitions will capture the dynamism of what was going on cannot 
possibly be true.
39
 
 
 35. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005). 
 36. For a relevant critique of Yoo’s work, see Stephen M. Griffin, LONG 
WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 41–45 (2013). 
 37. On the other hand, some legal academics took historians seriously. 
See, e.g., Martin Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995). 
 38. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Scalia’s opinion is arguably built on a number of 
preemptive moves. Most notably, he contends that the prefatory clause in the 
Second Amendment concerning “a well regulated militia” does not “limit or 
expand the scope” of the operative clause granting the right “to keep and bear 
arms.” Id. at 578. 
 39. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 391 (quoting Jack Rakove, Thoughts on 
Heller from a “Real Historian,” BALKANIZATION (June 27, 2008), http:// 
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Eventually Scalia took notice of the historians’ critique and 
the possible danger of “law-office” history, but his response was 
disappointing.
40
 He appealed to the stability of word meanings 
since the eighteenth century and noted that the Supreme Court 
has the help of “legions of academic legal historians populating 
law and history faculties at our leading universities.”
41
 The 
problem of “law-office” history, however, has to do with the 
selective use of historical evidence by lawyers and judges, 
motivated by the understandable pressing need to resolve 
specific cases.
42
 One possible option that tends to be 
shortchanged by the adversarial process is that the historical 
evidence is simply insufficient to resolve the question at issue. 
Moreover, the general problem Scalia never addressed is the 
lack of familiarity of lawyers and judges with the historical 
context of the founding period, a context which generations of 
historians have labored with much success to establish. 
Surprisingly, in a lecture at Harvard in the wake of Heller, 
Scalia contended that given that historians of the founding 
period were in disagreement, lawyers with their training in 
interpreting texts were well qualified to adjudicate among 
them!
43
 This was perhaps Scalia’s most audacious use of 
preemptive argument—positing that the legal method trumps 
history. 
Scalia’s second preemptive move to define the debate in 
terms of a stark opposition between originalism and 
nonoriginalism also impeded the progress of constitutional 
theory.
44
 Throughout his writings, Scalia seemed notably 
alienated from the real character of the American 
constitutional tradition. At least from the time of the Marshall 
Court, that tradition has exhibited a variety of methods of 
interpretation, all ably attested to by legal historians.
45
 The 
 
balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/thoughts-on-heller-from-real-historian.html. 
 40. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 399–402. 
 41. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 401 (citation omitted). 
 42. Cf. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM 
THEORY TO POLITICS 164–69 (1996). 
 43. See MURPHY, supra note 3, at 397, 410–14. 
 44. I recognize that some scholars believe the term “nonoriginalism” is 
unobjectionable as it simply means the rejection of originalism. But I think 
allowing originalists (following Justice Scalia) to define the argumentative 
terrain in this way grants them too much, as it in effect concedes that 
“nonoriginalism” is nontraditional and suggests that it offers no guidance as to 
how to interpret the Constitution. 
 45. See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 42, at 143–52. 
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true alternative to Scalia’s view is in fact the traditional or 
conventionalist view, grounded in Marshall’s common law 
approach to constitutional interpretation, that the sources of 
law familiar to Americans during the founding era and early 
republic were all legitimate starting points for methods of 
constitutional interpretation.
46
 
Pretty clearly, what Scalia really had in mind by 
“nonoriginalism” was any theory capable of justifying 
substantive due process, a doctrine he thought wholly 
mistaken.
47
 Even if this specific point is conceded, however, 
there is much legitimate constitutional interpretation, 
advanced throughout the entirety of American constitutional 
history, that has nothing to do with Scalia’s narrow take on 
how to use historical evidence—that is, the theory of original 
public meaning. Certainly defining “nonoriginalism” as the 
alternative made it easier for Scalia to avoid a meaningful 
engagement with the reasoning that led Supreme Court 
Justices and scholars to the perspective on constitutional 
change usually called the “living Constitution.” 
Two considerations that Scalia ignored are especially 
relevant. First, there is the inherent difficulty of advancing 
constitutional amendments over the supermajoritarian barriers 
imposed by Article V. This difficulty is compounded by what I 
have described as the “reverence feedback effect,” something 
well documented historically, which makes it politically 
difficult to advance even reasonable amendment proposals. 
Because the Constitution is not simply a law but a revered 
object of political identity, such proposals tend to be treated not 
only as critiques of a respected document, but as proclamations 
that America as a whole is on the wrong track.
48
 Americans 
resist these ideas. Living constitutionalists tend to believe that 
with the decline of interest in making significant amendments, 
there has been a corresponding pragmatic imperative for the 
Supreme Court, working with the political branches, to fill the 
gap. Living constitutionalists do not understand this to be a 
radical position because of the second consideration: our 
circumstances and values have in some instances changed so 
dramatically over the centuries that the framers’ perspective 
can be relevant only on a highly selective basis. 
 
 46. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); DAVID A. 
STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010). 
 47. Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 1, at 39. 
 48. GRIFFIN, supra note 42, at 39. 
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These considerations are well illustrated by Brown and the 
enormous legal and political effort required to dismantle 
segregation. Originalists tend to treat Brown as a single case 
about education (rather than about segregation as a whole) 
which poses a potential problem for their point of view.
49
 Scalia 
is no exception in this respect, asserting that the meaning of 
“equal protection” is sufficiently broad “to prohibit all laws 
designed to assert the separateness and superiority of the 
white race, even those that purport to treat the races equally.”
50
 
It’s hard to know what to make of this because Scalia did not 
purport to do the sort of historical research into the original 
public meaning of “equal protection” that was necessary. But if 
this is the original meaning of equal protection, then we have 
arrived at something close to what “nonoriginalists” or living 
constitutionalists have always contended—that given changed 
circumstances, it is justifiable to read capacious phrases like 
“equal protection” in an aspirational spirit. That is ultimately 
what the Supreme Court did in Brown and the cases that 
flowed from it. As Jack Balkin argues in his seminal Living 
Originalism, once Scalia made this move to emphasizing the 
semantic meaning of abstract phrases such as “equal 
protection,” the line between originalism and nonoriginalism 
became hair thin.
51
 
Scalia’s response to Brown was deficient in another way. 
The point living constitutionalists are making with Brown is 
not solely that originalism might not be able to justify 
important precedents that no one is interested in overturning. 
Brown and the Amazonian river of equal protection law that 
flows from it show that Scalia’s theory of legal legitimacy is 
flawed. From Scalia’s perspective, what should matter is that 
the opinion in Brown was not based properly on an inquiry into 
the original meaning of equal protection, something that 
presumably made it illegitimate when it was decided. If, 
however, the legal community treated Brown and its 
considerable progeny as not only legitimate, but with respect as 
involving a new understanding of what the Fourteenth 
Amendment meant and thus the cornerstone of a new era of 
judicial review (the “rights revolution”), then this showed that 
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Scalia’s originalism is missing something important about how 
legitimate constitutional change occurs within American 
history. 
At least since Brown, the Fourteenth Amendment is 
probably most responsible for inspiring the notion of the living 
Constitution. Scalia made things considerably easier on himself 
by rejecting the substantive due process doctrine and simply 
positing that the original meaning of equal protection does not 
have bad consequences in the present. If Scalia had curbed his 
penchant for using preemptive arguments for a moment, he 
might have perceived that the scholars he described as 
“nonoriginalist” came up with that perspective as a 
consequence of wrestling with the knotty interpretive problems 
posed by the clauses he was so assiduously avoiding. 
Nonetheless, in terms of the debate over constitutional 
interpretation, Scalia’s rhetorical strategy was a success. Scalia 
is certainly treated as if he made a major contribution to 
constitutional theory, even though it is striking how little he 
actually had to say about the interpretive problems posed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment—the problems that caused the 
contemporary debate in the first place. 
To return to the terms of college debate, how should we 
evaluate Justice Scalia—better on the Affirmative side or the 
Negative? Some debaters are known for having an affinity for 
one side over the other. On the affirmative side, there is no 
question that Justice Scalia was successful in promoting 
originalism as original public meaning and, as a consequence, 
sparking new interest among legal academics into launching 
more rigorous inquiries into the historical meaning of the 
Constitution. Yet the evidence that Justice Scalia was more 
comfortable on the negative is far more striking and 
persuasive. Scalia often seemed fairly gloomy about the course 
of constitutional law as he saw it in his years on the Court.
52
 
But it is noteworthy that even early on, Scalia saw the role of 
the Constitution and the Court in mostly negative terms. 
Rather than understanding the Constitution as an ongoing 
framework for government, Scalia tended to emphasize the 
purpose of the Bill of Rights in preventing ideas of “progress” 
from restricting rights and saw American society as just as 
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likely to “rot”
53
 over time as to advance toward a more 
promising future.
54
 
It is a shame that Scalia tended to wrap his version of 
originalism around the rule of law as if the two were identical. 
When the Supreme Court rejected relying on any doctrinally 
plausible version of originalism in Brown, it guaranteed the 
end of segregation and thus a corresponding massive increase 
in the rule of law for African Americans. Contrary to Scalia’s 
description of the civil rights decisions as relying on notions of 
a “judicial aristocracy,”
55
 the Supreme Court worked to assist a 
democratic social movement and, together with the political 
branches, achieved one of the greatest constitutional triumphs 
in American history, a Second Reconstruction. From Scalia’s 
perspective, however, was this a signal legal and constitutional 
achievement or an overdue reform motivated ultimately by 
political considerations? Given that Scalia seemed naturally 
inclined to be negative on American constitutional history, it 
remains unfortunately difficult to answer this question. 
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